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Abstract
It is well known that cooperation cannot be an evolutionary stable strategy for a non-iterative game
in a well-mixed population. In contrast, structured populations favor cooperation since cooperators can
benefit each other by forming local clusters. Previous studies have shown that scale-free networks strongly
promote cooperation. However, little is known about the invasion mechanism of cooperation in scale-
free networks. To study microscopic and macroscopic behaviors of cooperators’ invasion, we conducted
computational experiments of the evolution of cooperation in scale-free networks where, starting from
all defectors, cooperators can spontaneously emerge by mutation. Since the evolutionary dynamics are
influenced by the definition of fitness, we tested two commonly adopted fitness functions: accumulated
payoff and average payoff. Simulation results show that cooperation is strongly enhanced with the
accumulated payoff fitness compared to the average payoff fitness. However, the difference between
the two functions decreases as the average degree increases. As the average degree increases, cooperation
decreases with the accumulated payoff fitness, while it increases with the average payoff fitness. Moreover,
with the average payoff fitness, low-degree nodes play a more important role in spreading cooperative
strategies compared to the case of the accumulated payoff fitness.
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2Introduction
The emergence of cooperation is one of the challenging problems in both the biological and social sciences.
Cooperators benefit others by incurring some costs to themselves while defectors do not pay any costs.
Therefore, cooperation cannot be an evolutionary stable strategy for a non-iterative game in a well-mixed
population. This relationship between cooperators and defectors is well parameterized in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (PD) [3]. In PD, two individuals decide whether to cooperate or defect simultaneously.
They both obtain R for mutual cooperation or P for mutual defection as payoffs. If one selects cooperation
and the other selects defection, the former receives S for being the “sucker” of the defection, while the
latter receives T as a reward, which is the “temptation” to defect. The order of the four payoffs is
T > R > P > S in PD.
Nowak and May were the first to reveal that spatial structure provides a viable mechanism for coop-
eration to evolve [18]. Recently, spatial structures have been mapped to suitable network topologies and
the evolution of cooperation has been investigated through the analysis of PD played on those network
topologies [1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 24]. In this context, the effect of spatial structures required for the emer-
gence of cooperation is referred to as network reciprocity, which has come to be recognized as one of the
enabling mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation as well as the other ones [17].
On such spatial structures, cooperators can form clusters and thereby reduce the risk of exploitation
by defectors. In particular, it has been reported that scale-free networks strongly promote the evolution
of cooperation [24]. If a cluster of cooperators takes over a hub in a scale-free network, the payoffs for
these cooperators are considerably higher than those for other individuals, and thus they can spread their
cooperative strategy quickly to the entire network. In contrast, if a cluster of defectors takes over a hub,
this cluster of defectors is quite vulnerable and is easily replaced by cooperators. These effects explain
why cooperation is likely to evolve on scale-free networks.
However, it is still unknown how cooperator-dominated hubs could arise in society that initially has
few cooperators. It was assumed in [24] that the initial state of the social network was made of half
cooperators and half defectors. This setting has since been adopted by other studies on evolutionary
models of cooperation as described in [20,21]. This assumption does not explain how one cooperator that
emerged by mutation could increase in number and invade into the population initially filled by defectors.
This invasion dynamics has already been investigated for square lattice network topologies [7, 11]. In
3contrast, little is known about such invasion dynamics on scale-free networks, although the fixation
probability on scale-free networks has been reported in [12, 19]. Recently, Miller and Knowles studied a
model with a similar premise where coevolution of strategy and network growth starting from a very small
population is considered [15, 16]. Pinheiro et al. developed a “gradient of selection”, which numerically
decides whether cooperation increases or decreases under given fraction of cooperators (including only
one cooperator in a population) [22,23]. However, the microscopic mechanism of cooperators’ invasion is
not obvious in those studies because the analysis only focuses on fitness difference among all individuals
without taking into account how and where cooperation invades into a network.
Moreover, there is room for further investigation about how the evolution of cooperation depends on
the accumulated payoff fitness, which is usually assumed in the previous studies mentioned above. The
primary reason that cooperation is strongly promoted in scale-free networks is that cooperative hubs
can gain extremely high payoffs compared to the other nodes because such hubs have a large number of
connections to other cooperators. This effect of degree heterogeneity disappears if payoffs are averaged.
Therefore, in the case that averaged payoffs are used [25–28] or some costs are incurred to maintain
links [13], the evolution of cooperation is strongly inhibited. In this way, the evolutionary dynamics are
greatly influenced by the definition of fitness. The key question to be investigated is whether cooperation
emerges from such harsh environment and how it spreads into a network by analyzing the microscopic
behaviors of strategy evolution.
In this paper, we performed computer simulations of the evolution of cooperation in scale-free networks
where the initial population is all defectors but cooperators can spontaneously arise by mutation. In these
simulations, we tested two commonly adopted fitness functions: accumulated payoff and average payoff,
while the average degree of nodes is systematically varied. The purpose of this study is to reveal the
microscopic and macroscopic behaviors of the cooperators’ invasion into the network, and how they differ
between the two fitness assumptions.
Models
We consider the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators’ invasion in scale-free networks. The Baraba´si-
Albert method is used for generating initial networks in simulations [4]. Then, each generated network is
substantially randomized by the double-edge swap method while keeping the original degree distributions
4in order to remove artificial network properties that are known to occur in the BA model [5, 6]. Such
randomized scale-free networks are also used in [25] and it is known that, in this case, cooperation is
inhibited a little compared to the original BA scale-free network. Self loops and multiedges are avoided
during the randomization.
A network is made of N nodes occupied by individuals. Each node has its strategy classified as either
C (cooperator) or D (defector). Initially, all individuals are defectors. Each node i plays the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (PD) with all of its ki neighbors. The payoffs of the game are calculated as follows. Both
individuals obtain R for mutual cooperation and P for mutual defection. If one selects cooperation and
the other selects defection, the cooperator obtains S as the sucker of defection, and the defector obtains
T as the reward for temptation to defect. The order of the four payoffs is T > R > P ≥ S in typical PD.
In the case that P = S, the game is called weak prisoner’s dilemma. Following previous studies [18, 24],
we set P = 0, T = b, R = 1, and S = 0, where b > 1 is the only control parameter. The payoff of
individual i against its ki neighbors is denoted by pi. Here we consider two types of pi: accumulated
payoff and average payoff. The average payoff is obtained by dividing the accumulated payoff by ki.
We assume an asynchronous updating in our model as used in other recent models of evolutionary
games where the following operations are applied to each individual. At the beginning of each operation,
one randomly selected individual x plays PD with its neighbors and obtains payoff px. Next, one randomly
chosen neighbor of x, denoted by y, also plays PD with its neighbors and obtains payoff py. If px <
py, individual x imitates individual y’s strategy with probability (py − px)/[(T − S)kmax] [24], where
kmax = max(kx, ky), for the accumulated payoff condition and (py − px)/(T − S), for the average payoff
condition. kmax is used for normalization to be the probability less or equal than 1. Finally, another
randomly selected individual z (z might be the same as x or y) flips its strategy (C will become D and D
will become C) by mutation with probability m. These operations consist of the one time step (usually
called “Monte Carlo step” [21]).
We regard N time steps as one generation, in which all individuals are selected once, on average, for
the strategy update and mutation.
5Results
Macroscopic dynamics of cooperator invasion
First, we focus on macroscopic dynamics of the cooperators’ invasion. We compared simulation results
for the two fitness conditions (accumulated and average payoff fitnesses). For each fitness condition, we
conducted simulations by varying two parameters: the temptation to defect (b, from 1.1 to 2.0) and
the average node degree (k¯, from 4 to 16). The same tendency of the results holds for the larger two
values. The other parameters used in the simulations were N = 5, 000 (population size) and m = 0.005
(mutation probability). Results are shown in Fig. 1, which clearly shows the effects of b and k¯, as well as
the difference between the two fitness conditions.
Basically, cooperation is greatly enhanced in the accumulated payoff fitness condition than in the
average payoff fitness condition, as previous studies have reported [24, 25]1. This is because cooperative
hubs can gain much greater payoffs than others by having a large number of connections to other cooper-
ators, as long as the temptation to defect b is not too large. However, our results show that, if b is large
(e.g., b > 1.8, k¯ = 8), cooperators may not be able to occupy hub nodes and therefore the cooperation is
not promoted any more.
Moreover, in the accumulated payoff fitness condition, cooperation decreases as the average degree
increases, which disagrees with what was originally reported in [24]. This disagreement is due to the
difference in model settings: In the model used in [24], the initial population was filled by half cooperators
and half defectors, so having a higher average degree made it easier for cooperators to form a cluster
initially by themselves. Once such clusters are formed, they hardly collapse because there is no mutation
in [24]. In contrast, our model assumes that the initial condition is full of defectors, and that cooperators
appear only by mutation. In this model setting, it is easier for cooperative clusters to form if the average
degree is low, because a cooperator will be connected to fewer defectors. We also checked the usual case in
which the initial population is filled by half cooperators and half defectors and found that the difference
among the average degrees are weakened in such a case (results not shown).
In contrast, cooperation increases as the average degree also increases in the average payoff fitness
condition. Therefore, the difference between the two functions decreases as the average degree increases.
This is because a probability of a rare cluster of cooperators being able to connect to other cooperators
1However, the final levels of cooperation are lower in our model than in those other models, because there are no
cooperators in initial configurations and the clusters of cooperators can collapse due to mutation in our model.
6increases as the average degree increases. In that case, the chance for cooperators to survive increases.
Note that this situation happens only when cooperation is not dominant such as the initial stage of inva-
sion. Once cooperation prevails, defectors can exploit cooperators more as the average degree increases
because a probability of being connected to cooperators increases in such a situation. Then, the situation
approaches a well-mixed population, which is harmful for cooperation, inversely.
In brief, our results showed an interesting difference between the two fitness conditions, in terms of
the effect of average node degrees. These findings rely on our unique model settings in which cooperators
are initially non-existent and they spontaneously arise by mutation.
Microscopic dynamics of cooperators’ invasion
Next, we investigate the microscopic dynamics of cooperator invasion. We used k¯ = 8 and b = 1.2 as a
representative parameter setting throughout this section, because the general trend was consistent even
if they are varied. Figure 2 shows histograms of strategy propagation events, plotted over the degrees of
source and destination nodes. Spontaneously emerged cooperators by mutation try to invade a network
of defectors. In that phase, if clusters of cooperators are formed by chance, the invasion is likely to
succeed. This situation happens in the first 300-400 generations as you can see in Fig. 3. After that, only
minor changes take place. Therefore, in each case, the first 500 generations of 10 replicate simulations
are recorded because the first 500 generations are enough to see the invasion of cooperation.
As seen in Fig. 2A and B, only lower-degree nodes can change higher-degree nodes’ strategies in the
average payoff fitness condition. As a result, cooperation tends to spread more frequently from lower
degree nodes in the average payoff fitness condition (Fig. 2A) than in the accumulated payoff fitness
condition (Fig. 2C). This is because the benefit of being hubs for cooperators disappears in the average
payoff fitness condition, as discussed above. In contrast, a relatively wide range of node degrees can
cause a change in the strategy of neighbors although the strategy of hub nodes cannot be changed in the
accumulated payoff fitness condition (Fig. 2C and D).
To investigate the effects of the local surrounding environment for the propagation of cooperation,
we also plotted histograms of strategy propagation events over the degree of the source node and its
neighbors’ state ratio (1 = fully cooperative neighborhood, 0 = fully defective neighborhood) in Fig. 4.
In the accumulated payoff fitness condition, a node with any degree can change its neighbors’ strategy
in general. Moreover, as neighbors’ state ratio becomes greater, the frequency of strategy change tends
7to be greater because such a high cooperation ratio contributes to raise the fitness of the source’s node.
In contrast, in the average payoff fitness condition, only low node degrees with any neighbors’ ratio tend
to be a cause of change in the strategy of neighbors as shown in Fig. 4A. In the case of high source node
degrees in Fig. 4A, cooperators are easily invaded by defectors because defectors simply can get high
payoff from such a high ratio of cooperators, resulting in no existence of defectors with a high neighbor
ratio of cooperators as shown in Fig. 4B.
Case of donation game
In all the simulations above, we adopted a “weak” PD setting where the sucker’s payoff (S) is equal to the
punishment (P ), which is a common assumption made in many earlier studies (e.g., [18, 24]). However,
this assumption does not create an incentive for cooperators to switch their strategy to defection when
they play a game with defectors.
In order to test the robustness of our findings in a “strong” PD setting with T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S, we conducted another set of simulations using the “donation game” model. The donation
game is a special class of “strong” PD where each cooperator provides a benefit b to the other player by
incurring cost c to himself, with 0 < c < b. Thus, the payoff structure of the donation game is given by
T = b, R = b−c, P = 0, and S = −c [8]. For simplicity, we varied just one parameter b from 1 to 2, while
letting c = b− 1. Figure 5 shows the fraction of cooperators on scale-free networks in the simulations of
the donation game. We find cooperation is greatly inhibited in the donation game compared to the weak
PD. Cooperation sharply drops in both cases and the same tendency between average and accumulated
payoff fitness conditions with the weak PD can only be seen in the low limited range of b (b = 1.1). In
the case of the weak PD, the payoffs between P and S are the same by definition, making cooperators
not so disadvantageous against defectors. In contrast, in the donation game, defectors can easily exploit
cooperators. Thus, cooperation can only survive within the limited range of b.
Conclusion
It is known that scale-free networks strongly promote cooperation due to their heterogeneity. It is also
known that this advantage is mostly lost when average payoffs are adopted. However, little is known about
how cooperation can spread from initially rare cooperators in the two cases. Here we show that the fate
8of cooperation between the average and accumulated payoff fitness condition is very different depending
on the average degree. In general, cooperation is promoted in the accumulated payoff fitness condition
as previously found. However, the difference between accumulated and average payoff decreases as the
average degree increases, which is not commonly discussed in the previous studies. More importantly,
as the average degree increases, cooperation decreases with the accumulated payoff fitness, while it
increases with the average payoff fitness. This implies that the evolution of cooperation on a network
depends significantly on how game players are rewarded through their game play. Moreover, from the
in-depth analysis of microscopic behaviors, we show that the relative importance of low degree nodes for
the evolution of cooperation is much higher in the case of the average payoff, compared to the previously
studied case of the accumulated payoff where hubs are known to play a major role in the propagation of
cooperation.
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Figure 1. Fraction of cooperators against b in different average degree settings. The average of 10
independent simulation runs (the last 1,000 generations for each) is shown.
12
Figure 2. Frequency of strategy propagation events, plotted over the source node’s degree and the
destination node’s degree in the average payoff fitness condition (top: A and B) and the accumulated
payoff fitness condition (bottom: C and D). Cooperation propagation is on the left (A and C) and
defection propagation is on the right (B and D). N = 5, 000, k¯ = 8, m = 0.005 , and b = 1.2. First 500
generations of 10 replicate simulations are recorded.
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Figure 3. Fraction of cooperators vs. time. The average of 20 independent simulation runs is shown.
N = 5, 000, k¯ = 8, m = 0.005, and b = 1.2.
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Figure 4. Frequency of strategy propagation events, plotted over the source node’s degree and its
neighbors’ state ratio in the average payoff fitness condition (top: A and B) and the accumulated payoff
fitness condition (bottom: C and D). Cooperation propagation is on the left (A and C) and defection
propagation is on the right (B and D). N = 5, 000, k¯ = 8, m = 0.005, and b = 1.2. First 500 generations
of 10 replicate simulations are recorded.
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Figure 5. Fraction of cooperators in the case of the donation game.
The average of 10 independent simulation runs (the last 1,000 generations for each) is shown.
